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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Supreme Court No. 371 91-2009 
PlaintiffIRespondent, ) 
v. 
TONI M. LeCLERCQ, FILED - COPY 
DefendantIAppellant. 1 
) 
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District Judge 
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I. ISSUE 
The primary issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in affirming the 
Magistrate's order denying LeClercq's Motion In LimineMotion to Suppress. Implicit in that 
issue is whether a police officer, during a DUI investigation, can threaten a driver with a forcible 
blood draw during Idaho's implied consent procedure. See, Appellant's argument set forth in her 
brief, p. 5. See, also, Notice of Appeal, R. 136, para. 3(c). 
The Respondent complains that LeClercq did not set forth a concise statement of issues 
on appeal, See, Respondent's Brief, p. 3, but LeClercq submits that they are clearly stated in her 
Notice of Appeal and based upon her arguments presented to the Court in her opening brief, the 
issue would be whether LeClercq's breath test results should be suppressed based upon the police 
officer's improper conduct and coercive threats to forcibly draw blood during the implied 
consent state of an investigation. 
Under IAR 35(a)(4) LeClercq believed that she complied with that provision as stated 
above. 
I1 ARGUMENT 
There is something fundamentally wrong, or flawed, with the idea that the Idaho 
legislature has established a statutory mechanism whereby a driver has given her implied consent 
to submit to evidentiary testing for blood alcohol concentration pursuant to Idaho Code 5 18- 
8002 but yet when, as in this particular case, the requirements of that statute are being conveyed 
to LeClercq, the officer adds information, clearly outside the statute, by telling LeClercq that the 
police officer will forcibly draw her blood in the event she refuses to submit to a breath test. The 
idea of due process in gathering evidence, and seeking to take LeClercq's driving privileges away 
from her, the Idaho legislature passed a law establishing what process is due to a particular driver 
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who is under suspicion of DUI. It is offensive, then, that if during that procedure a police officer 
can be permitted to make threats to forcibly draw blood: threats that are outside the parameters 
of what "shall" be conveyed to the driver. 
Accordingly, this is not a case such as State v. Woolery, 1 16 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 
(1 989) where the "implied consent" exception to the Fourth Amendment was in play. In 
Woolery, a different exception to the Fourth Amendment was used by the Idaho Supreme Court 
to take the driver's blood based upon exigent circumstances. They are two separate and distinct 
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment that warrant individual analysis. For example, the Woolery 
court noted: 
InSchmerber, the United States Supreme Court recognized that a warrantless 
seizure of blood of a driver, as long as probable cause exists and the 
withdrawal of the blood is done in a reasonable fashion, does comply with the 
provisions of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, where probable cause exists and 
the evidentiary test was conducted in a reasonable manner, whether or not the 
officer complied with the provisions of I. C. $ 18-8002(3), the results of the 
evidentiary test should be admissible in a criminal prosecution. 
1 16 Idaho at 374. 
Thus, in Woolery, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished exigent circumstances and 
implied consent as exceptions to the Fourth Amendment. The search of LeClercqYs blood 
alcohol content was not based upon exigent circumstances but rather an application of the 
implied consent statute. LeClercq ultimately submitted to the breath test but it is her argument 
that her submission to the test was coerced with threats of a forcible blood draw and an advisory 
that went way beyond the confines of due process established in the implied consent statute. 
See, also, State v. De Witt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 2 15 (Ct. App. 2008) where the Court 
approved a blood draw, based upon exigent circumstances, on an unconscious driver. However, 
counsel for LeClercq respectfully disagrees with the Courts additional language in De Witt where 
it states, "[elven if the exigent circumstances exception was inapplicable, the blood draw was 
valid pursuant to DeWitt's implied consent." Id., 145 Idaho at 713. It appears to be dicta and 
does not appear to be on point with the issue that was raised on appeal: "DeWitt filed a motion to 
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suppress the evidence of the blood test, arguing that because it was done while he was 
unconscious, the blood draw violated his Fourth Amendment rights." 145 Idaho at 71 1. It 
appears from the De Witt opinion, that the defendant did not argue a violation of Idaho's implied 
consent law and that the Court embarked on that journey on its own. 
Likewise, the same can be said for State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007, 
reh 'g denied,) where the issues that were analyzed by the Court were whether an involuntary 
blood draw violates federal or state constitutional protections in cases where no death or serious 
bodily injury is involved, and whether Idaho Code fj 18-8002(6)(b) prohibits involuntary BAC 
testing in cases where no death or serious bodily injury is involved. LeClercqYs issue is different 
than those raised in Diaz, and the dicta in Diaz that is off point from the issues raised, cannot be 
construed as case precedent when the Court said, "filecause Diaz had already given his implied 
consent to evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood 
draw." 
It is apparent that the Idaho Appellate Courts have applied the implied consent statute 
without the foundation of the statutory provisions to use it as an exception to the Fourth 
Amendment. It is respectfully submitted that such treatment of the implied consent law is 
misplaced. Understandably, the Respondent suggests in its brief that, "[b]ecause the question of 
coercion is legally irrelevant when the breath test is the result of implied consent Nickerson, 132 
Idaho at 410, 973 P.2d at 762, this argument fails." See, Respondent's Brief, p. 7. However, the 
State's argument does not hold up when compared to Schmerber, Diaz and De Witt, where the 
various courts have acknowledged that regardless of the means of obtaining blood alcohol 
content under the Fourth Amendment, it must be reasonable. Even in State v. Harmon, 132 
Idaho 80,952 P.2d 402 (Ct. App. 1998) the Court acknowledged that there may be certain 
situations under the implied consent that would be unreasonable. "We do not entirely rule out 
the possibility that a search conducted pursuant to statutory consent could be rendered 
unreasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes if the search were accomplished by . . . police 
misconduct." 13 1 Idaho at 85. 
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The police officer involved in this case was dealing with a 59-year old woman.' LeClercq 
also takes issue with the State's argument that she was "merely" given "the choice of two 
perfectly legal means by which he could acquire the evidence to which the State was entitled." 
See, Respondent's Brief, p. 8. LeClercq was not given a choice. She was told that if she refused 
to submit to the breath test, she would be taken to the hospital where her blood would be forcibly 
drawn. 
III. CONCLUSION 
LeClercq requests that this Court reverse the District Court's Order affirming the 
Magistrate's denial of LeClercq's Motion In LiminelMotion to Suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 2010. 
&22L 
B NE.  ELKINS 
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